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A Family Affair: Constitutional
and Prudential Interests Implicated When




stablishing a home and raising a family are among the most
deeply rooted values of our society.' Despite an almost universal
recognition that family is fundamental to happiness, for homo-
sexual persons, creating and preserving their own families can be elusive.
This is an examination of the legal treatment of homosexual persons who
seek to create a family through adoption or preserve their family relation-
ship in the context of a custody or visitation dispute.
Part I addresses the constitutional issues implicated by such proceed-
ings, focusing on how the existence of parents' fundamental liberty
interests impacts the legal analysis of each category of dispute.2
Part II explores the approaches courts take when a couple has
separated, one parent is homosexual, and a dispute over custody or
visitation arises.3 Specifically, it compares cases in which courts employ a
presumption of detrimental impact on a child caused by the homosexual
conduct of a parent, with an approach that places such conduct among
factors relevant to the consideration only upon an evidentiary showing of
* J.D. expected 2002, University of Kentucky.
'See generally Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (proscribing interference
with the right to marry based on racial classifications); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (dealing with parent/child relationship); Skinnerv. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (asserting right to procreate); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing liberty interests in childrearing and
education).
2See infra notes 11-68 and accompanying text.
3See infra notes 69-217 and accompanying text.
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detrimental impact. The comparison identifies how each approach
implicates constitutionally protected liberties.4
Part III probes the issue of adoption by homosexuals, examining the
policies which guide legislators and courts. This Part also examines how
courts construe statutory provisions in the context of adoption by a de facto
parent.5
While courts cite the best interests of the child as the "polestar"6 for
determination of custody and adoption proceedings, the element of
homosexuality infuses such cases with highly controversial moral and
social issues. The legal positions of homosexual persons differ depending
upon the nature of the proceeding, and the analytical framework hinges
upon whetherthere is a cognizable constitutional interest at stake.7 Because
the range of issues involved is broad, the thesis of this note is threefold.
First, when resolving custody and visitation disputes, the court must guard
the liberty interests of parents against unjustified state interference with an
approach that places weight upon the homosexual conduct of a parent only
upon an evidentiary showing that the conduct impacts the child's interests.'
Second, constitutional challenges to denial of adoption privileges based on
sexual orientation are likely to fail, thus it is up to citizens, through their
legislators, to define the terms by which the privilege to adopt may be
granted.9 Finally, in the context of an adoption case involving a child and
adult who have already established the child-parent bond, prudential
interests advise courts to construe adoption statutes broadly to confer upon
the child advantages that inhere in a legal relationship. 10
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Although members of society may hold common notions about the
morality of homosexuality, the legal framework that shapes familial rights
4 See infra notes 185-217 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 218-79 and accompanying text.6 E.g., In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 886 (Ohio 1990).
7 See infra notes 15-63 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 59-217 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 38-63, 256-64 and accompanying text.
'oSee infra notes 223-51 and accompanying text.
"This Note does not explore the distinction between status and conduct with
regard to homosexual parents. In the domestic context, courts have expressed little
concern for the distinction between status and conduct. See Dean v. District of
Columbia, 653 A.2d 307,363 n.5 (D.C. 1995) (Steadman, J., concurring) ("In the
marriage context, the much-mooted distinction between homosexual orientation
1228 [VOL. 89
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of homosexuals differs greatly depending upon the context of the proceed-
ing. The challenges a homosexual confronts in seeking to preserve an
existing, legally recognized parent-child relationship differ from those
faced by a homosexual seeking to establish such a relationship through
means of adoption. Interference with an existing parent-child relationship
implicates fundamental rights inherent in parenthood. 2 In contrast,
adoption is a purely statutory privilege, 3 and members of state legislatures
hold broad discretion in defining the terms by which such privilege is
granted.14 Although various attitudes toward homosexuality may generally
influence treatment of homosexuals in custody, visitation, and adoption
proceedings, the rules that guide courts in their resolutions shape signifi-
cantly different analyses.
A. The FundamentalLiberty Interest Implicated in Custody and Visitation
Disputes
When ajudge must resolve a dispute between parents unable to agree
on a custody or visitation arrangement for their child, it is inevitable that
there will be some limitation of the parent-child relationship for at least one
of the parents involved. The judge may choose to remove or deny custody
to one parent' 5 or limit visitation against a parent's desires.16 Although it
is parents who place the court in a position of resolving such disputes,
denial of custody or limitation of visitation privileges ultimately results in
and homosexual acts does not seem particularly relevant."). In cases in which a
parent's homosexuality is a factor relevant to child custody, a court will often refer
to the parent's decision to engage in "sexual conduct" rather than to the parent's
status as a homosexual. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 904 (N.C.
1998).
12 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (stating that the sub-
stantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests, including the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children).
'" Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Mass. 1993); In re Jacob, 660
N.E.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995); see In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035, 1047
(Conn. 1999).
1 In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987) ('In foster care
and adoption cases, the State by law has either the exclusive, or highly significant,
responsibility to choose what is best for the child.").
sSee infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
'
6 See infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
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interference with the parental role. 7 Recently, in Troxel v. Granville,"a the
United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the parent-child
relationship is entitled to heightened constitutional protection, characteriz-
ing "the interest of parents in the care, custody and control of their
children-[as] perhaps the oldest of fundamental liberty interests recog-
nized by this Court." 9 In that case, the Court invalidated a Washington
statute, 0 which conferred broad discretion upon courts to grant visitation
privileges to any person based on a finding that such privileges would be
in the best interests of the child' The Court emphasized its long history of
protecting the liberties that inhere in parenthood, and stated "it cannot
now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children."'n The Court emphasized the
presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children,24 and
disapproved the lower court's approach of substituting its own judgment
for that of the fit parent.' This enunciation of interests underscores the
"7 While a court called upon to resolve such a dispute generally "interferes"
only upon the initiation of one or both of the parents, this does not mean that in
doing so, parents must sacrificetheir rights and subsequently relieve the court from
a duty to protect their interests. We entrust courts with the authority to adjudicate
controversies in order to arrive at resolutions which most effectively protect the
rights which we have embraced through our laws and constitutions.
's Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
'9 Id. at 65; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (finding
natural parents' fundamental liberty interest exists even after losing custody of
children temporarily); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972) (sustaining
father's challenge to a state policy which deprived unwed fathers of custody of
children upon the death of their mother despite failure to establish father's lack of
fitness); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right.., to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the "liberty" protected by the
Due Process Clause includes rights of parents in establishing a home and making
decisions in educating their children).
20 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75.
21 See id. at 67 ("[The language ofthe statute] effectively permits any third party
seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the
parent's children to state-court review.").
22 Id at 65-66.
2 I. at 66.
24 See id at 68.251 Id. at 72-73. "[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe
on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because
a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made." Id
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deliberation with which judges must act in order to guard against unjusti-
fied interference of fundamental parental liberties.
To adequately protect the due process interests implicated,26 interfer-
ence with parental rights must be justified by a "powerful countervailing
[state] interest."27 Courts have characterized the best interests of the child
as the "polestar" which guides the determination in such cases.2' Indeed,
states do have both a powerful interest and a duty to guard the welfare of
children.29 Furthermore, when resolving a custody or visitation dispute, a
court must allocate parental rights and duties between persons who both
possess fundamental liberty interests. Because any resolution reached will
inevitably interfere with at least one of the parents' rights, a court should
employ an analytical framework that most effectively promotes the interest
relied upon to justify such interference, the interests of the child. Other-
wise, proffered justifications become pretexts,"0 and courts fail to suffi-
ciently guard against unwarranted interference with the parent's fundamen-
tal liberty interest.
In child custody orvisitation disputes, courts must make determinations
based upon highly individualized factual settings to promote the interests
of the individual child involved3 For this reason, it is inappropriate to
begin the analysis with the presumption that homosexual conduct of a
parent has a detrimental impact upon the child. If a court must make a
determination based upon the needs of a particular child, employing a
26 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. This interest might also be char-
acterized as a fundamental right in the context of an equal protection claim. For
purposes of the custody and visitation disputes, however, this analysis is limited to
the due process concerns raised. Action by courts in individual cases is more
accurately characterized as interference of such interests rather than classification
which triggers equal protection concerns.
27 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("The private interest here, that
of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.").
' See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
29See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652; see also Parham v. J.R., 442, U.S. 584, 603
(1979) (recognizing that the state may have control over parental discretion when
child's welfare is endangered); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,254-56 (1978)
(holding that father's due process and equal protection rights were adequately
protected by the "best interests of the child" standard); In re Goshkarian, 148 A.
379, 381(Conn. 1930) (asserting that the right of a parent in the control and custody
of her child gives way to the paramount concern of the child's welfare).3oSee infra notes 74-144 and accompanying text.
31See infra notes 74-184 and accompanying text.
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presumption before evaluating the individual circumstances is inherently
inconsistent with the "best interests of the child" standard. This precludes
an individualized examination of the well-being of the particular child
involved, and thus, the presumption obstructs the goal of reaching a result
which best serves the needs of the child.
The problem created by employing such a presumption is illustrated in
Stanley v. Illinois 2 The Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Illinois
law when it deprived Peter Stanley of custody of his children after the death
of the children's mother, to whom he was never married. The state asserted
that unwed fathers were presumptively unfit.33 While the Court acknowl-
edged that most unwed fathers may be "unsuitable and neglectful
parents,"34 it nevertheless rejected the approach of employing such a
presumption." In reversing the decision, the Court observed that by
employing a presumption, the state failed to meet its stated interest of
protecting children when it separated them from fit parents. 6 Likewise,
when a court employs a presumption of detrimental impact based on the
homosexual conduct of a parent, the court "spites its own articulated
goals"37 when, in fact, there is no such detrimental impact. Because the
welfare of the child is precisely the interest that justifies interference with
the fundamental liberty interest held by a parent, an approach that fails to
promote that interest risks violating the constitutional rights of the parent.
The better approach places the homosexual conduct of a parent among
factors to be considered upon a evidentiary showing of impact on the child
because it is most likely to promote the best interests of the child involved,
and .thus remain within the constitutional boundaries imposed when
fundamental parental liberties are implicated.
B. The Constitutional Issues Raised in the Adoption Context
A homosexual seeking to adopt does not enjoy the same constitutional
protection as a natural parent. At the outset, there is not a legally recog-
12 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645.
33 Id at 646. The cases in which courts employ a presumption generally do not
go so far as to hold homosexual parents as presumptively unfit, rather they presume
detrimental impact upon the child. See infra notes 74-144 and accompanying text.
The cases are sufficiently analogous, however, because this presumption of impact
precludes individual assessment of the particular child's interests.
34 Stanley, 405 U.S at 654.
'- See id at 654-55.36 Id. at 652-53.
37 Id. at 653.
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nized parent-child relationship at stake. Instead, the analysis begins with a
purely state-created privilege." Examination of the legal treatment of a
homosexual seeking to adopt a child involves an inquiry of whether the
state may deny that privilege based upon the applicant's sexual orientation.
It is instructive to approach the question from the perspective of a
homosexual person or couple seeking to adopt an unrelated child.39 This
establishes the respective positions of the state and the prospective adoptive
parent, and presents the perspectives of courts that have addressed the
constitutional questions raised. A more complicated situation arises when
the person seeking to adopt has already established a parent-child
relationship with the prospective adoptee. ° While some courts have
construed adoption statutes broadly to allow two homosexuals to join in
adopting a child,4 ' such decisions have been based upon prudential
considerations rather than recognition of a constitutional right to adopt.42
Generally, case law reveals that there is no constitutional right to adopt, and
homosexuals' desire to create legally recognized relationships with
biologically unrelated children depends upon state legislatures' enactment
and courts' interpretation of adoption laws.43
Florida law leaves no room for interpretation, as homosexuals are
categorically ineligible to adopt." Most other adoption laws are silent on
the issue of sexual orientation,45 and in those states, the person seeking to
adopt must rely upon a court's construction of the applicable statute and
determination as to whether the adoption should be granted.46 A person who
38See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
39See infra notes 224-51 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 252-77 and accompanying text.
4' See infra notes 269-77 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 252-77 and accompanying text.
41 See In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987).
44FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997) ("No person eligible to adopt
under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.").45 E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (Supp. 2000); but see N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.16(h)(2) (WESTLAW through Nov. 2000).
"Applicants shall not be rejected solely on the basis of homosexuality. A decision
to accept or reject when homosexuality is at issue shall be made on the basis of
individual factors as explored and found in the adoption study process as it relates
to the best interests of adoptive children." Id (emphasis added).
' See In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884,886 (Ohio 1990) ("[Tjhe
right to adopt is not absolute.... [the statute] preserves the right of a trial court to
grant or deny a petition for adoption based upon the evidence germane to each
case.").
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challenges a statute or a court's refusal to grant an adoption based on
sexual orientation, alleging violations of substantive due process or equal
protection, is armed with virtually no precedential support.
1. Substantive Due Process
The privilege to adopt is not a fundamental liberty interest47 Adoption
is a relatively recent creation of state legislatures and cannot accurately be
characterized as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply
rooted in thisNation's history and tradition."'9 Likewise, a person's choice
to engage in homosexual sodomy is not protected as a fundamental liberty
interest."0 Courts have, therefore, refused to sustain due process challenges
asserting that denying an adoption based on homosexuality interferes with
a fundamental liberty interest.5 '
Sometimes, the person seeking to adopt has developed a relationship
with the child in question, and wishes to legally formalize the relationship
through adoption proceedings.52 In such cases, one might argue that refusal
to grant the adoption constitutes interference with fundamental liberty
interests that arise out of the de facto parental role.53 Even courts willing to
construe adoption statutes broadlyto allowunmarried, homosexual persons
to join in an adoption have been unwilling to recognize as legitimate the
rights of de facto parents.' 4 In light of such precedent, it is unlikely that a
"
7 See State v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), quashed
on other grounds sub nom. Cox v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs.,
656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 26
(N.H. 1987).
"
8 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325-26 (1937), overruled by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,794 (1969).
" Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J.,
plurality).
'0 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (denying that homo-
sexuals have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy).
s See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 26-27 (N.H. 1987).
52See infra notes 252-77 and accompanying text.
5 Cf In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27,28-29 (N.Y. 1991) (ex-
cluding a biological mother's former partner from the statutory class "parent,"
where both mother and partner had previously agreed to jointly share all rights and
responsibilities of childrearing).
' See id at 29 (refusing to grant visitation privileges to de facto parent despite
established parental relationship with the child). But see In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d
397, 398 (N.Y. 1995) (refusing to adopt literal construction of adoption statute
which would deprive children of legal relationship with de facto parent).
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court would agree that a denial of the privilege to adopt interferes with
fundamental liberties when the parent-child relationship in question is not
otherwise legally recognized 5
2. Equal Protection
Generally, courts do not categorize homosexuals as a suspect class,
5 6
thus, they are not afforded heightened protection from laws that classify
based on sexual orientation57 Courts analyze the constitutionality of a
55 This does not, however, foreclose the possibility that a child involved in such
circumstances could succeed in a constitutional challenge to such a denial. The
Court has expanded the protection accorded to families beyond the parental role.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (Powell, J.,
plurality) (invalidating restrictive city ordinance found to interfere with grand-
mother's choice to live with her son and two grandsons); see Lofton v.
Butterworth, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (upholding standing of
a foster child and his foster parent to challenge, under the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, Florida statute prohibiting
homosexual adoption). In Lofton, plaintiff child, eight years old at the time of the
proceeding, was placed with the plaintifffoster father from the time of his infancy.
Lofton, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1344. In light of an existing relationship, and the
widespread recognition of the advantages that inhere in adoption, the state's
proffered interest in promoting the "best interest of the child" is defeated by its
refusal to grant legal recognition to the existing family relationship. Cf Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1972).("Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, the State
spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from his family.").
Accordingly, it seems that a child could succeed in a challenge to a state's refusal
to allow adoption in such a circumstance. See Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d
1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) ('To deny the children of same-sex partners, as a class, the
security of a legally recognized relationship with their second parent serves no
legitimate state interest.").
'See, e.g., In re Opinion ofthe Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987); see also
State v. Cox, 627 So. 2d. 1210, 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), quashedon other
grounds sub nom. Cox v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d
902, 903 (Fla. 1995). But see Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 500
(Ky. 1993) ("[Homosexuals] are a separate and identifiable class for Kentucky
constitutional law analysis because no class ofpersons can be discriminated against
under the Kentucky Constitution.").
57 See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d at 24 ("[S]nce no suspect
or quasi-suspect class.., is involved, the proper test to apply in determining the
bill's constitutionality for federal equal protection purposes is whether the
legislation is 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.'" (quoting
2000-2001] A FAMILY AFFAIR 1235
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
state's denial of adoptive privileges employing a rational basis standard5
This standard is satisfied if the denial is "rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose."'59 The state's interest in promoting the interests of
children is often advanced as the guiding purpose of an adoption statute.'
This has been recognized as a legitimate state interest."' Since laws
subjected to a rational basis standard are accorded a presumption of
constitutionality,62 appellate courts reviewing a denial of adoption are
unlikely to question legislative classifications to determine whether the
denial truly promotes the child's best interests in a particular case.63
C. Comment
The existence of cognizable constitutional claims significantly
influences the analysis required in various proceedings. A custody or
visitation dispute involving a homosexual parent calls for an analytical
framework that adequately protects the fundamental liberty interest at
stake. The welfare of the child is a powerful state interest that can justify
interference with the liberty interest of a parent," but a court must do more
than simply cite the child's interests as the guiding principle. A court
should promote that interest by closely scrutinizing the factual basis upon
which it determines what is in a child's best interests rather than employing
a presumption against the parent6 In addition, a court should be careful to
Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,446 (1985))).
58 See, e.g., id
19 Id (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446).
60 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 886 (Ohio 1990).61 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) ("Illinois has declared that
the aim of the ... [a]ct is to protect 'the moral, emotional, mental, and physical
welfare of the minor.... These are legitimate interests, well within the power of
the State to implement.").
62 See generally Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79
(1911) ("When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state
of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.").63 See id.
" Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.
65 Cf Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,69-70 (2000) ("[T]he court's presump-
tion [that visitation with grandparents would be in the best interests of the child]
failed to provide any protection for Granville's fundamental constitutional right to
make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughters."); Stanley, 405 U.S.
at 658 ("[The state of Illinois] insists on presuming rather than proving Stanley's
1236 [VOL. 89
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avoid substituting its judgment for that of the parent when there is no
evidence that the parent's judgment effects a detriment on the child.'
In contrast, the lack of a recognized constitutional interest in the
privilege to adopt requires a less guarded approach in the context of
adoption proceedings. The state has broad power to determine eligibility to
adopt,67 and courts have discretion to implement adoption policies through
the approval or denial of adoption applications." While circumstances
might suggest that courts should employ a fact-based analysis rather than
a presumptive approach, a court is on more solid constitutional ground
when it substitutes its judgment for that of a prospective adoptive parent.
II. HOMOSEXUALITY OF PARENTS IN CUSTODY OR VISiTATION DISPUTES
Homosexuality of a parent plays a significant role in the resolution of
a child custody or visitation dispute. While the severity of disapproval each
homosexual parent faces in such a context varies, a review of case law
reveals two general patterns of treatment. Some courts presume that
homosexual conduct has a detrimental impact on the child.69 Others require
evidence that the conduct has had or will have a detrimental impact on the
child before they consider it relevant to the determination. 0 In every case,
unfitness solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove.... [Tihat
advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing ....").
I Cf Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (ITihe Troxels did not allege... that Granville
was an unfit parent. That... is important, for there is a presumption that fit parents
act in the best interests of their children."); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 655 ("[N]othing
in this record indicates that Stanley is or has been a neglectful father who has not
cared for his children.").
67See In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987).
See In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 886 (Ohio 1990).
See Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (pre-
suming that illicit sexual conduct on the part ofa parent is detrimental to the child);
Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (asserting that primary
custody by homosexual parent who openly resides with a partner would rarely be
in the best interest of the child); LP. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786,793 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989) ("[C]ircumstances have been consistently found to require that a child not
be placed or remain in the custody of a homosexual parent and that visitation of a
homosexual parent be restricted or terminated .... Living with a homosexual lover
provides the basis for a change of custody.').
70 See S.N.E. v. RIL.B., 699 P.2d 875, 880 (Alaska 1985) (asserting that con-
duct of a parent is relevant to a modification of a custody order only when the
evidence supports a finding that the conduct has or will have an adverse impact on
the child); In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290 (Ct. App. 1988)
2000-2001] 1237
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the standard cited by courts is the "best interests of the child."7' Even with
such a prominently established "single" standard, however, the approach
employed with regard to a parent's homosexual conduct bears a noticeable
impact on the analysis of both the parents' rights and the child's interests.
Infringement upon fundamental parental rights is justified by the state
interest in protecting the child,' but an approach that employs a presump-
tion precludes a fact-based assessment of the needs of the child. And, thus,
the justification necessary to constitutionally infringe upon such rights is
absent?3
A. The Presumptive Approach
Courts are generally faced with refereeing child care disputes between
parents in one of three contexts: marriage dissolution, custody modifica-
tions, and visitation privileges.74 In amarriage dissolution, if parents cannot
agree on the custody or visitation arrangement, the court must make an
initial allocation.75 Courts have the most discretion at this point, as there are
the fewest presumptions as to who would be the most appropriate parent to
receive primary custody.76 At a later point, one parent may request a
modification of the custody arrangement, which requires evidence of a
change in circumstances warranting the modification, due to the disruption
of the child's life caused by such a change.7 A court may also be called
upon to allocate visitation privileges, which are generally provided to a
(requiring "an affirmative showing of harm or likely harm to the child... in order
to restrict parental custody or visitation"); In re Marriage ofCabalquinto, 669 P.2d
886, 888 (Wash. 1983) (en bane) (asserting that "homosexuality in and of itself is
not a bar to custody or to reasonable rights of visitation").71 See generally Exparte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (Ala. 1998); Weigand
v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581,585 (Miss. 1999); JA.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336,
339 (Mo. 1998) (en bane); Davenport v. Davenport, 220 S.E.2d 228, 230 (S.C.
1975); Bottoms v. Bottoms 457 S.E.2d 102, 104 (Va. 1995); Rowsey v. Rowsey,
329 S.E.2d 57, 60 (W.Va. 1985).
2 See supra notes 15-36 and accompanying text.
73 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,658 (1972).
74 See, e.g., 16 LOUISE E. GRAHAM & HON. JAMES E. KELLER, KENTUCKY
PRACTICE §§ 21.1, 22.2 (2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2001).
71 See, e.g., id. §§ 21.1, 22.3.
76See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 877 (Alaska 1985).
7 E.g., id ("[W]hen one party seeks a change in custody, a court must consider
whether there are changed circumstances which justify modifying a prior custody
order.").
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parent on a reasonable basis, in order to foster the relationship between the
child and the non-custodial parent.7 8
In a modification of a custody arrangement, the parent seeking
modification bears the burden of proving that the benefits of such
modification outweighs the inherently disruptive effects of changing
custody.79 In Exparte J.MF.,80 the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a
mother's establishment of an openly lesbian relationship and a father's
remarriage constituted changes that supported a modification in the custody
arrangement. 1 The court of appeals had reversed the decision of the trial
court to grant the change of custody.' In doing so, it applied Alabama's
rule that a parent's heterosexual misconduct cannot support a change of
custody absent a finding of detrimental effect upon the child to homosexual
conduct of a parent.83 The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the lower
court, and rejected the proposition that there must be evidence ofdetrimen-
tal impact." The supreme court concluded that the court of appeals applied
the wrong standard, as the father did not seek a change of custody based
solely upon the mother's homosexual conduct, but also on his own
establishment of a heterosexual marriage. 5 By considering the father's
heterosexual marriage in addition to the mother's homosexual conduct, the
court avoided determining whether the standard applicable in a change of
custody arising from heterosexual conduct is also applicable to a case
involving homosexual conduct.' The court did not explicitly conclude that
" E.g., Boswell v. Boswell, 701 A.2d 1153, 1163 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)
(stating that a parent has a right of access to his/her child at reasonable times when
child is in the custody of another), aff'd, 721 A.2d 662 (Md. 1998).
79 Exparte Johnson, 673 So. 2d410, 413 (Ala. 1994); see also S.N.E., 699 P.2d
at 878 ("[W]e have repeatedly stated our concern with maintaining continuity of
care and avoiding disturbing and upsetting the child with repeated custody
changes."); Montgomery v. Marcantel, 591 So. 2d 1272,1273 (La. Ct. App. 1991).80 Exparte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998).
811d at 1196.
s2 See id at 1194.83Id
84 See id at 1194, 1196.
8 Id. at 1194 (stating that the applicable rule required the father must only show
that the change in custody would materially promote the child's best interests and
the positive effects brought about by this change would "more than offset the
inherently disruptive effect of uprooting the child").86 See id at 1194 n.2 ("Because the standard applicable in a change-of-custody
case arising from heterosexual misconduct does not apply in this case, the Court
of Civil Appeals' 'adoption' of that standard for cases involving homosexual
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homosexual conduct of the parent is presumptively detrimental to the
childY It did note, however, that "[w]hile the evidence shows that the
mother loves the child and has provided her with good care, it also shows
that she has chosen to expose the child continuously to a lifestyle that is
'neither legal in this state, nor moral in the eyes of most of its citizens.' '
The court also asserted that there was sufficient evidence of potential harm
to the child from homosexual conduct to support a change in custody. 9
This emphasis on the mother's homosexuality, despite recognition that she
provided good care for her child, reveals a presumptive approach. The
presumption in this case undermined the "best interests of the child" and
simultaneously implicated the fundamental parental rights of the mother.
Weigandv. Houghton?' also involved a father's request for a modifica-
tion of custody.91 In this case, the father was in a homosexual relationship
of eight years, and the mother was in a heterosexual marriage.92 The father
sought to obtain custody because he was concerned that his son was being
exposed to mental and emotional abuse due to the stepfather's physical
abuse of the boy's mother." The chancellor analyzed several factors. 4
misconduct of the custodial parent is dictum.").
87 See id at 1194.
" Id at 1196 (citing Exparte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793,796 (Ala. 1998)). In Ex
parte D. W. W., 717 So. 2d at 793, the Supreme Court of Alabama, in affirming a
trial court's restrictions on visitation, stated that even without evidence of adverse
impact by mother's lesbian relationship, the trial court would be justified in
restricting visitation to limit exposure to the lesbian lifestyle. Id at 796. The court
seemed to use using the presumptive approach rejected in Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1971). See supra notes 15-37 and accompanying text.
89 ExparteJ.MF., 730 So. 2d at 1196.
o Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1999).91 Id at 584.
92Id
93 Id Weigand's concern arose after two incidents of violence between the
boy's mother and stepfather. The first resulted in a conviction for simple assault,
and the second in a conviction for public drmnkeness and malicious mischief. Id.
' See id at 586-87 (citing as factors for consideration in decisions regarding
custody: age of the child; health, and sex of the child; a determination of the parent
who has the continuity of care prior to separation; which parent has the best
parenting skills and which has the willingness and capacity to provide primary
child care; the employment of the parent; physical and mental health and age of the
parents; emotional ties of the parent and child; moral fitness of the parents; the
home, school, and community record of the child; the preference of the child at the
age sufficient to express a preference by law; stability of home environment and
employment of each parent; and other factors relevant to the parent-child
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Although the chancellor found that the father could offer a more stable
home,' he placed the most emphasis on the factor of moral fitness and
refused to grant the custody modification.' The Supreme Court of
Mississippi upheld the chancellor's ruling.' The dissent expressed concern
that seven of the chancellor's twelve pages of custody analysis were
dedicated to the issue of the father's homosexuality. 8 This, the dissent
argued, indicated that the chancellor and the majority were so "blinded"9'
by the father's homosexuality, that they were willing to leave the boy in a
home with a felony-convicted, physically abusive, unemployed stepfather
who also served as primary caregiver due to the mother's demanding work
schedule."° While the supreme court did not explicitly recognize a
presumption that homosexual conduct detrimentally impacts a child, it
deferred to the chancellor's finding that the moral concern raised by the
father's homosexual conduct outweighed other factors inhis favor, without
evidence that the father's homosexual relationship had detrimentally
impacted his son.'
In Weigand, the presumption of homosexual conduct's detrimental
effect is more difficult to identify than in other cases employing such a
presumption. This is because the court's decision consisted of a carefully
articulated analysis of the factors considered to be relevant in a custody
modification case." The presumption is revealed, however, by the courts'
disproportionate focus on the element of moral fitness and the surprising
lack of attention given to the violent home environment provided by the
custodial parent'0
In Thigpen v. Carpenter,'° a homosexual mother appealed a trial
court's modification of a joint custody arrangement to an award of sole
relationship).
9 1d at 586.
96 Id. at 590 (McRae, J., dissenting) (quoting Chancellor Lynchard's petition
denial) ('Moral fitness of the parents: It is this factor above all others which causes
the greatest concern with the Court.").
97 Id at 587-88.
Id at 589 (McRae, J., dissenting).
i d at 588 (McRae, J., dissenting).100 Id. (McRae, J., dissenting).
0 Id at 586-87.
"o Id at 586 ("[Ihe chancellor addressed and analyzed each of the Albright
factors before determining that it was in the best interest of Paul to remain in the
custody of his mother....").
103 See I d at 589 (McRae, J., dissenting).
'o Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).
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custody to the father."°5 The Court of Appeals of Arkansas affirmed the
decision and pointed to evidence of the mother's emotional instability as
support for the trial court's ruling.'" In addressing her homosexual
relationship, the court posited that "it has never been necessary to prove
that illicit sexual conduct on the part of the custodial parent is detrimental
to the children. Arkansas courts have presumed that it is."'0" The court did
address the appellant's parental rights, as she challenged the custody
modification and visitation restrictions on the grounds that the trial court's
ruling violated her constitutional rights.' While the court acknowledged
the existence of basic rights which attach to parenthood, it rejected the
appellant's claim that due process requires that there be a nexus between
the parent's activity and the harm to the child." The court's ultimate
decision in this case was justified by evidence of the mother's emotional
instability,"' but its analysis could have yielded the same result even if
other justifications were absent."' The court equated the mother's
homosexuality itself with "illicit sexual conduct.""1' 2 Furthermore, the court
explicitly recognized a presumption that illicit sexual conduct has a
detrimental impactupon the child."3 By equating homosexuality with illicit
sexual conduct, and utilizing a presumption of detrimental impact, the court
engaged in an analysis which placed minimal attention on the interests of
the particular children involved.
In Scott v. Scott,"4 a mother in a homosexual relationship appealed a
trial court's decision to designate the father as the domiciliary parent in the
joint custody arrangement."' The Court of Appeals of Louisiana affirmed
the ruling of the trial court, holding that the mother's decision to live with
'
05Id at 511.
"o' Id at 512 (reporting that the appellant's mother testified regarding her
daughter's history of instability and stated that the appellant "had a sudden
turnaround to everything she had always believed in").
"
7 Id at 513. The presumption has been applied to heterosexual promiscuous
conduct as well as homosexual conduct. See Digby v. Digby, 567 S.W.2d 290,292-
93 (Ark. 1978); Walker v. Walker, 559 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Ark. 1978).
10' Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d at 513.
09 Id
110 Id at 512, 513-14 (noting that the father testified that the mother had
previously attempted suicide and was suicidal at th6 time of their separation).
"' See id at 514.
12 See id at 513.
113 Id
114 Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
"1 See id at 762.
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the children and her partner in the same residence was a change of
circumstance that materially affected the welfare of the children and
supported the court's modification of the original custody arrangement."
6
The mother cited Lundin v. Lundin,"7 and urged the court to recognize that
because she maintained a discreet relationship with her partner, her
childrens' interests were not detrimentally affected."' In Lundin, the court
stated that the "mere fact of homosexuality may not require a determination
of moral unfitness so as to deprive the homosexual patent of joint
custody.""' 9 The court affirmed the holding of Lundin with regard to a
determination of joint custody.2 ' The presumption against homosexual
parents in general was, however, made apparent by the court's dicta
regarding the issue of whether a homosexual parent who openly resides
with his or her partner would be entitled to primary custody of the minor
children: "It is the opinion of this court that under such facts, primary
custody with the homosexual parent would rarely be held to be in the best
interests of the child."''
In J.A.D. v. F.JD., the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld a trial
court's award of custody to a father based in part on the mother's
history of homosexual relationships." The presumption that homosexual
conduct has a detrimental impact on the interests of the children was
apparent from the trial court's treatment of the mother. Not only was she
denied custody, but broad visitation restrictions were imposed. She was
also ordered to engage in a session in which she was to tell her children of
her homosexual conduct." While the supreme court denied that any
Missouri case had ever held that a homosexual parent was ipso facto unfit
for custody of his or her child,' it affirmed the decision of the trial
116 Id. at 765.
"17 Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
'I See Scott, 655 So. 2d at 766.
"9 Lundin, 563 So. 2d at 1277.
120 Scott, 655 So. 2d at 766.
121 Id.
1 J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
'2 See iad at 339-40.
12 4 See id at 340 (prohibiting the children from being in the presence of any
person known by the mother to be a lesbian or one who engages in lesbian activity).
125 Id at 338.
126 Id. at 339. But cf J.P. v. P.W. 772 S.W.2d 786, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
("[C]ircumstances have been consistently found to require that a child not be
placed or remain in the custody of a homosexual parent and that visitation of a
homosexual parent be restricted or terminated."); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d
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court,'2 7 which appeared to presume detrimental impact on the children as
a result of the mother's homosexual conduct.128
In addressing the factor of homosexuality, the supreme court asserted
that a court may consider the impact upon children in making the custody
determination,129 but it did not require a connection between harm to the
child and the parent's homosexual conduct to be found before such conduct
is considered relevant to the determination. 3 ' The practical implication of
the ruling was that courts may presume detrimental impact, as the court
refused to adopt the nexus test proposed by the court of appeals in its
consideration of the case.1
3 1
Comparing the supreme court's treatment of this case to that of the
court of appeals illustrates the tension between the presumptive approach
and that which requires an evidentiary basis of finding detrimental impact
In its analysis, the court of appeals began by recognizing the liberty
interests of parents in maintaining a relationship with their child. 32 It then
reviewed Missouri cases in which homosexuality was a factor in a custody
or visitation dispute and found that courts had applied a per se rule,
presuming homosexual conduct of a parent rendered them unfit. 33 The
court of appeals adopted the nexus test, which requires "a connection, or
nexus, between the parent's sexual conduct, homosexual or heterosexual,
and harm to the child must be established before the parent's sexual
conduct is considered relevant to the custody determination."'' 34 The court
of appeals concluded that the trial court erred in awarding custody and
restricting visitation based on the mother's homosexual conduct absent
evidence of its impact on the children, and reversed and remanded the case
for consideration of all relevant factors. 13 The supreme court, in affirming
164, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("In the few cases in our state dealing directly with
the problem of a homosexual parent seeking primary custody, all courts have
awarded custody to the non-homosexual parent, and restricted the homosexual
parent's visitation rights, again relying on the impact upon the child.").
127 See J.A.D., 978 S.W.2d at 339-40.
"See Delong v. Delong, No. WD 52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *12 (Mo. Ct.
App. Jan. 20, 1998), transferred to J.A.D., 978 S.W.2d at 336.
12 J.A.D., 978 S.W.2d at 339-40.
130 See id
'3' See Delong, 1998 WL 15536, at *1l-12.
132 Id. at *3-4.133 Id at "6-1 1.
34Id. at *11.
131 Id. at *12.
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the trial court, simply asserted that there was substantial evidence in the
record to supportthe custody determination."36 The decision by the supreme
court implicitly rejected the adoption of the nexus test by the court of
appeals. Holding that homosexual parents are not ipso facto unfit did not
affect the approach taken by the court, as it failed to articulate how the
impact of homosexual conduct ofa parent on a child must be established.'37
Thus, the presumption against a homosexual parents was left essentially
untouched.13
In Pulliam v. Smith,'39 the Supreme Court of North Carolina approved
the decision of a trial court to grant a change in custody from a homosexual
father to the mother." The court found that the father's homosexual
activities supported the trial court's finding of" 'improper influences'
which are 'detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the two minor
children."", This decision was not based upon the father's homosexuality
alone, as the court clearly articulated several examples of conduct by the
father and his partner that it considered improper such as:
the regular commission of sexual acts in the home by unmarried people,
failing and refusing to counsel the children against such conduct while
acknowledging this conduct to them, allowing the children to see
unmarried persons known by the children to be sexual partners in bed
together, keeping admittedly improper sexual material in the home and
Mr. Tipton's taking the children out of the home without their father's
knowledge of their whereabouts support the trial court's findings of
"improper influences" which are "detrimental to the best interest and
welfare of the two minor children. '142
3I J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336,340 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). The court did,
however, reverse the trial court's visitation restrictions limiting conduct with "any
... female, unrelated by blood or marriage, with whom J.A.D. may be living," and
remanded with directions to limit the condition to apply only to those whose
conduct would be contrary to the best interests of the children. Id
137 Id at 339-40.
13" But see Heidi C. Doerhoff, Note, Assessing the Best Interests of the Child:
Missowi Declares that a Homosexual Parent is Not Ipso Facto Unfitfor Custody,
64 Mo. L. REV. 949,985 (1999) (asserting that by holding that homosexual parents
are not ipso facto unfit for custody of their children, the Missouri Supreme Court
appeared to be sending a signalto judges who may have viewed such parents as per
se unfit).
139 Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898 (N.C. 1998).
140 Id at 899.
141 Id at 904.
142 Id.
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Rather, the presumption of the court was grounded in the conclusion that
such conduct is detrimental, without substantial attention focused upon a
connection between the conduct and its effect on the children. The dissent
expressed the concern that the majority relied on its own moral disapproval
of the father's conduct,143 and noted that the only evidence that the children
suffered as a result of the father's homosexual conduct was insufficient to
support a change of custody.'"
B. Homosexuality Relevant Only Upon Evidence of Detrimental Impact
In S.N.E. v. AL.B., the Alaska Supreme Court applied the nexus test
in an action brought by a father seeking to change custody of the child from
the mother to himself. I The father sought custody on the grounds that the
mother was a lesbian with radical political views. He claimed the mother
was emotionally unstable, and that he was the child's primary parent' 47 The
trial court granted the father custody.'" The supreme court reversed,
holding that"[c]onsideration ofaparent's conduct is appropriate only when
the evidence supports a finding that a parent's conduct has or reasonably
will have an adverse impact on the child and his best interests."'149
Furthermore, the court ignored consideration of the stigma attached to a
parent's status as a homosexual in a custody decision.' Because the record
contained no evidence that the homosexual conduct of the mother had or
was likely to affect the child adversely, the court reversed and remanded
the case.'5'
This approach represents a dramatic departure from a presumption of
detrimental impact' The most significant distinction is the movement of
a court's focus away from the parent and to the particular child involved in
the dispute, with the central inquiry being what evidence supports a change
in custody.' Such a shift in focus indicates that the court is not motivated
4 Id at 905.
144 Id
141 S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
1 "See id. at 878.
14 Id at 877.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 879.
150 Id
151 Id
132 See supra notes 74-151 and accompanying text.
" See S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 878 ("When a court determines the best interests of
the child under the changed circumstances doctrine, the scope of judicial inquiry
is limited to facts directly affecting the child's well-being.").
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by the parent's sexual orientation and validates the proffered interest of
promoting the welfare of the child.
In Rowsey v. Rowsey, 54 the trial court granted a father's request for a
change in custody because, in violation of the divorce decree, the mother
associated herself and her children with a woman found by the trial court
to be a lesbian. 55 The Supreme Court of West Virginia reversed. 56 While
the court acknowledged that the mother violated the terms of the custody
arrangement, it held that the mother's association with a reputed lesbian
was not grounds for changing custody to the noncustodial parent.57 The
court found no evidence of adverse impact on the children caused by the
association with the mother's friend,"'8 and asserted that "[a] change in
custody based on a speculative notion of potential harm is an impermissible
exercise of discretion." '159 It is worth noting that the court did not explicitly
examine whether the mother herself was homosexual, and thus the court's
conclusion differs from others discussed because it does not directly deal
with the mother's sexuality, but rather, her relationship with another person
known to be a homosexual."6 The general principle announced by the
decision, however, reflects the view that custody decisions should be based
upon evidentiary findings of impact, rather than presumptions unsupported
by the facts on record.
In Guinan v. Guinan,161 a father appealed the family court's award of
joint custody with primary physical custody to the mother. 62 The appeals
court pointed to the factors in the mother's favor: the children had been
residing with their mother; she was able to provide more personal time to
raising the children than the father; and two of the children had expressed
desire to continue living with her." There was also conflicting evidence
as to whether the mother had engaged in homosexual relationships."6' With
regard to this question, the court stated that "[a] parent's sexual indiscre-
tions should be a consideration in a custody dispute only if they are shown
" Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57 (W. Va. 1985).
155 See id at 59-60.




16o See id at 59-61.
161 Guinan v. Guinan, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830 (App. Div. 1984).
162 See l at 830.
163 Id at 831.
"6 Id. ("Conflicting evidence was introduced by the parties regarding whether
defendant had engaged in sexual relations with other women, thus creating a
question of fact as to this issue.").
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to adversely affect the child's welfare."" This decision implicitly refused
to distinguish between homosexual and heterosexual conduct, and applied
the same standard to both in order to determine the circumstances under
which consideration of such conduct is appropriate to make custody
determinations.
In Stroman v. Williams,'" the Court of Appeals of South Carolina
affirmed the decision of the family court, which had denied the father's
request for a change in custody based on his contention that the mother's
homosexuality rendered her unfit as a matter of law. 67 The appeals court
rejected the father's argument, and stated: "[a] parent's morality, while a
proper factor for consideration, 'is limited in its force to what relevancy it
has, either directly or indirectly, to the welfare of the child.' "s The court
then emphasized the significance of an evidentiary showing of impact
on the child, and pointed to the record, which was devoid of evidence
of adverse effect to the daughter's welfare caused by the mother's
homosexuality. 69 The court also placed weight in the fact that the record
reflected no detrimental impact on an older daughter, who was "heterosex-
ual, intelligent, and well-mannered after having lived with the mother and
the other woman for a five-year period."170 The court seemed careful not to
lend approval to the mother's status as a homosexual, yet refused to
interfere with the parental relationship absent an evidentiary basis for doing
SO.
171
In Birdsall v. Birdsall (In re Marriage of Birdsall), the court
addressed the effect of homosexuality of a parent in the context of a
" Id; see also Di Stefano v. Di Stefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636, 637 (App. Div.
1978) ("While the sexual life style [sic] of a parent may properly be considered in
determining what is best for the children, its consideration must be limited to its
present or reasonably predictable effect upon the children's welfare.").
"
6 Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
'
67Id at 705.
' Id. (citing Davenport v. Davenport, 220 S.E.2d228, 230 (S.C. 1975) (affirm-
ing a decision granting custody to the mother despite her adulterous relationship)).
" 'Id ("Our own examination of the record did not uncover any evidence that
... [the daughter's] welfare was being adversely affected in any substantial way.").
70 Id at 706.
'7 Id at 705-06. In fhct, one could conclude that the court implicitly dis-
approved of the mother's homosexual status, as when it referred to the lack of her
daughter's exposure to sexual conduct, it used the language "deviant sexual acts."
Id at 705.
"Birdsall v. Birdsall (In re Marriage ofBirdsall), 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App.
1988).
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visitation dispute.' The father challenged a court order prohibiting
"overnight visitation... in the presence of any third person known to be a
homosexual."" The father lived with two other homosexual men, neither
of whom had ever engaged in sexual relations with the father." Thus, the
father would have been forced to leave his home to exercise visitation with
his child according to the court order.76 The appeals court vacated the
order, and held that while a court may consider homosexuality as a factor,
along with other evidence,'" "an affirmative showing of harm or likely
harm to the child is necessary in order to restrict parental custody or
visitation."'" The court asserted that a parent's homosexuality, "without
link to detriment to the child, is insufficient to constitute harm." 79
In re Marriage of Cabalquinto'° also involved the visitation rights of
a homosexual father."' The father appealed a decision that denied his
request for an order to allow visitation with his son in his state of residence,
California." 2 The Supreme Court of Washington was unable to determine
a basis for the trial court's ruling, and remanded the case after the court
emphasized the rule that homosexuality is not a bar to custody or reason-
able rights of visitation."
The cases that reject a presumption of detrimental impact present a
different analytical approach than those that employ such a presumption.
They demand an assessment of the facts underlying the court's decision
about the interests of the individual child, by pointing to the evidence, or
lack thereof, which directly relates to the welfare of the child.' While the
ultimate result in each case may be susceptible to criticism, a close
assessment of such facts necessarily places emphasis on the goal of
promoting the interests of the child.
1731 Id at 287.1741Id
75 Id at 288.
176 See id
I" Id at 289.
178 Id at 290.
179 Id at 291.





'8 Id at 888.
'"See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d875, 879 (Alaska 1985) ("Consideration
of a parent's conduct is appropriate only when the evidence supports afinding that
a parent's conduct has or reasonably will have an adverse impact on the child and
his best interests." (emphasis added)).
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C. Comment
The tension between the presumptive approach and that which requires
an evidentiary showing of detrimental impact hinges on the fundamental
belief that a conventional, heterosexual family environment is simply better
for a child. 85 Such an approach is understandable. The decision maker in
a custody or visitation dispute is often faced with children who have been
subjected to a painful conflict between the two most significant figures in
their lives. Society's general condemnation of homosexuality, which
manifests itself in the form of legal, as well as social, disadvantages, creates
a valid concern for courts seeking to provide the most healthy and stable
solution for the children. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that
criticism of the presumptive approach does not necessarily constitute a
criticism of the results reached by courts that have employed such a
presumption. In fact, as noted in the analysis of Thigpen v. Carpenter, the
evidentiary basis may reveal sufficient reason, independent of the
homosexuality of a parent, to justify interference with parental rights.'86
The interests of children are, however, most effectively promoted by an
analytical framework that places the homosexual conduct of a parent
among the factors to be considered only upon the proper evidentiary
showing. Such an approach most closely adheres to the guiding principle
of the "best interest of the child," which is espoused by courts to be the
proper standard in child custody or visitation disputes.' The evidentiary
approach provides a more balanced treatment of an issue that necessarily
implicates a comparative analysis.'" By requiring a link between the
homosexual conduct of a parent"8 9 and detrimental impact to the child,
'
85 See J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that
"there are sufficient social, moral, and legal distinctions between the traditional
heterosexual family relationship and illicit homosexual relationship to raise the
presumption of regularity in favor of the licit, when established, shifting to the
illicit, the burden ofdisproving detriment to the childred' (alteration in original))
(citing Constant A. v. Paul C. A., 344 496 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)).
' See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
' See In re Parsons, 914 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
189 In some states, homosexual conduct in itself is misconduct, as sodomy is
illegal. See, e.g., Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581,590 (Miss. 1999) (McRae,
J., dissenting). This Note takes the position that regardless of the viewpoint held
by the state as to the morality of such conduct, it is relevant only to the extent that
there is an evidentiary basis for a finding of impact on the child.
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courts are less likely to trample on the fundamental rights that inhere in
parenthood.' 90
1. The Best Interests of the Child
One virtue ofthe "best interest of the child" standard is that it provides
courts with the flexibility to evaluate the circumstances of each case, and
render solutions based on the specific needs of the individual child.191 The
trial court has the opportunity to personally observe the people involved in
a custody dispute, and assess the family situation first-hand. Thus, trial
courts are generally accorded broad deference by appeals courts." When
a court employs a presumption of detrimental impact, a close assessment
of the needs of the specific child, the advantages offered by each parent,
and other factors relevant to the consideration is necessarily truncated. A
non-presumptive approach treats each child as an individual, and based on
the particular circumstances, asks the critical question of what is best for
that child.
Perhaps the approach employed is most significant in an action for
custody modification. In this context, a presumption that the homosexual
conduct of a parent detrimentally impacts the welfare of the child immedi-
ately displaces the interest of continuity of care, a crucial interest in such
a case. 93 In addition, the burden of showing that the advantages to the child
will outweigh the disruptive effect of a change is on the parent seeking
modification 94 When the custodial parent is homosexual, a presumption
of detrimental impact essentially shifts the burden of proof from the parent
seeking the modification to the parent currently in custody of the child."
"' See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("The liberty
interest... of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children... is
perhaps the oldest ofthe fimdamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.").
'91 Cf Di Stefano v. Di Stefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636, 637-38 (App. Div. 1978)
(explaining that in a custody proceeding, a court's sole concern is the best interests
of children, and that the broad discretionary power of the nisi pruis court in such
matters must be accorded great respect).
' See generally Exparte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1195 (Ala. 1998). See also
Davenport v. Davenport, 220 S.E.2d 228, 230 (S.C. 1975) (asserting that the
"totality of circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon
which the ultimate decision can be weighed").
.
93 See S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 878-79 (Alaska 1985).
' See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
'
9 5 See supra notes 74-1,14 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, in order to maintain continuity of care and avoid potentially
harmful disruption of the child's situation, the custodial parent must
affirmatively prove that his or her conduct has not and will not have a
detrimental impact on the child. This is a heavy burden that may be
impossible to satisfy, depending upon the court's view of homosexuality.
While it may not be difficult to show that a child is currently well-adjusted
and unaffected by such conduct, it is harder for a parent to prove to the
court that there will be no detrimental impact in the future, even with expert
opinion and studies indicating support for such a proposition.1 This is
especially true when one realizes that the courts employing such a
presumption are also the courts most concerned with the effect ofhomosex-
ual conduct on the child's moral development."9 Therefore, the practical
implication of such a switch in the burden of proof is a result which ignores
the interest of maintaining continuity of care and avoiding disruption in the
child's life, which are basic to the best interests of a child.'"
When a court is faced with a child custody dispute, it is placed in the
position of comparing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the parents
and allocating custody accordingly.'" When the courtpresumes detrimental
impact caused by homosexual conduct of one parent without evidence to
support such a finding, it is more likely to overlook factors that would
normally bear a significant influence on the court's analysis. For example,
in Weigand, the trial court was presented evidence that the boy's primary
caretaker, his stepfather, was a convicted felon, had two convictions arising
out of domestic disputes, suffered from depression, and had abused
alcohol.2' Despite such facts, the trial court focused the majority of its
analysis upon the morality of the father's homosexual lifestyle, which
raised greater concern than the fact that the child was exposed to the
196See Exparte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1193 (Ala. 1998). The homosexual
mother's own expert witness and the court-appointed psychologist both testified
that the studies they reviewed revealed no adverse impact as a result of a child
being raised in a household with a homosexual parent. I The guardian ad litem
did point to studies which reached the opposite conclusion. Id
19I7 at 1195 (expressing thatthe motherhad established an environment where
she presented homosexuality as the moral equivalent of a heterosexual marriage).
l9 S See generally S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 877& n.2 (emphasizing that modification
requires some change in circumstances to justify moving the child).
'" Cf Exparte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at 1194 (holding that heterosexual father's
remarriage in combination with mother's more open homosexuality warranted
custody modification).2
"o See Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581, 584 (Miss. 1999).
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violence and threats of his step-father."' In G.A. v. D.A.," 2 the dissenting
opinion expressed concern that the majority's custody decision was based
solely on the sexual orientation of the mother, and therefore the majority
ignored evidence the home environment offered by the father was
inferior.2 °3 In Exparte D. W. W.,2 the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed
visitation restrictions which required the homosexual mother to exercise
her visitation only at the maternal grandparent's home.20 5 In doing so, the
court dismissed evidence that the father of the children, their custodial
parent, had a history of alcohol and domestic abuse, and asserted that this
information was relevant only to the custody decision, which was not raised
on appeal.2° The court failed, however, to consider that a comparative
analysis is appropriate to the determination of visitation privileges, just as
it is relevant to the custody determination.
Visitation restrictions, especially those that require the parent to
exercise visitation in a place other than her own home, place a burden upon
the parent that will likely inhibitvisitation. The less contact a non-custodial
parent has with a child, the greater the influence of a custodial parent. A
comparative analysis is, therefore, appropriate, and the evidence of a
father's faults become relevant even in the visitation context. These
examples illustrate that the "best interests of the child" standard demands
evaluation of the relative strengths and weaknesses of parents on either side
of the dispute. A presumption against one parent, absent evidence
supporting such presumption, creates an undue imbalance in the court's
analysis.
An additional factor raised by the presumption approach that detracts
from the principle of the best interests of the child is the punitive nature of
decisions which deny custody or visitation based on the court's moral
judgment of homosexual conduct. This is clearly demonstrated in the case
of J.D., in which the trial court denied custody to the mother, severely
limited her visitation privileges, and ordered her to participate in a "telling
201 See id at 586-87 ("TIhe morality of David's lifestyle was one important
factor to consider in the eyes of the chancellor....").
SGA. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
203 See id at 729 (Lowenstein, J., dissenting) ("The mother provides the child
with his own room in a well kept house, enrolls him in pre-school, has a steady
nursingjob .... The father has a limited education, an income of $6500 and lives
in basically a one room cabin containing a toilet surrounded by a curtain....').
' &xparte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793 (Ala. 1998).
205 See id at 795.
' See id at 795 n.1; id at 797 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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session" to inform her older children of her orientation.2 " The order to
participate in a "telling session was particularly indicative of the punitive
nature of the decision, especially in light of the fact that the trial court also
ordered the mother not to expose her children to aspects of her homosexual
lifestyle during visitation."' The order placed the mother in a position of
simultaneously revealing and hiding herself from her children, implying
that her orientation is shameful. Regardless of the motive for ordering such
a session,2°9 the ultimate effect is punitive. The presence of a punitive
element in a decision regarding a custody dispute raises the concern that the
court has inappropriately shifted its focus from the best interests of the
child to an inquiry of what a parent morally deserves.2
2. The Constitutional Issue
"[A] parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody,
and management of his or her children' is an important interest that...
warrants deference and absent a powerful countervailing interest, protec-
tion."' While the interests of the child in a custody or visitation dispute
always override other interests, the fundamental liberty interest inherent in
parenthood is implicated in such cases.2 1 2 Therefore, courts should employ
an analytical framework that is most likely to promote the interests of the
child while remaining cognizant of parental rights. Of course, in the context
of a custody dispute, a court is also faced with a contest between two
parents, each of whom have rights to be considered. Therefore, simulta-
neously balancing parental rights and reaching a solution that is best for the
child creates a difficult task.
Courts justifiably place parental rights in a position subordinate to the
ultimate concern of the best interests of the child. When, however, a court
2
'
7 See J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). At the
point of appeal, the'"telling session" had already occurred, thus the issue was moot.
Id. at 340.
2o. Delong v. Delong, No. WD 52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998), transferred to J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d at 336.209 See J.A.D., 978 S.W.2d at 338 ("The Court recognizes the benefit to the
daughters of their mother telling them herself so that they will have first hand
knowledge ... ).210 See generally Larson v. Larson, 902 S.W.2d 254,257 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995);
Davenport v. Davenport, 220 S.E.2d 228,230 (S.C. 1975).
21 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).212 See supra notes 15-37 and accompanying text
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employs a presumption, precluding an analysis tailored to the needs of the
particular child at issue, it risks failing to promote that child's interests
while also violating parental rights. This is especially true in the context of
a dispute over the visitation privileges of the non-custodial parent.
While visitation between a non-custodial parent and a child is not an
absolute right, the parent does have a right of access to the child at
reasonable times.2"' Generally, such restrictions involve a limitation on the
child's contact with homosexual partners of the parent or prohibiting
overnight visitors during visitation.21 4 Such restrictions may apply to non-
custodial parents in heterosexual relationships as well.2 5 From the
perspective of a parent in a longstanding, monogamous relationship, in a
state where homosexual sodomy is legal, however, such restrictions may be
unconstitutional. The parent must make arrangements that involve
considerable inconvenience and expense in order to foster a relationship
with the child. More importantly, the parent is forced to present his or her
lifestyle as something that should be hidden, which interferes with the
prerogative of a parent to make decisions about the basic social beliefs and
values when raising a child. When a court places heavy restrictions on
visitation based on the presumption that the homosexual conduct of a
parent is detrimental to the child, with the attendant lack of evidence of
detrimental effect on the child, it places an undue burden on the non-
custodial parent in maintaining a relationship with that child. This burden
"unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents ... to direct the
upbringing and education of [their] children,"216 an interest guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.217
H. THE ADOPTION PRIVILEGE
Adoption is purely statutory,28 and whether a homosexual person is
granted the privilege to adopt turns upon interpretation of adoption laws
and the discretion conferred upon judges who determine whether an
23 E.g., Boswell v. Boswell, 701 A.2d 1153, 1165 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997),
aff'd, 721 A.2d 662 (Md. 1998).
214 See, e.g., Exparte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793,794 (Ala. 1998).
215 See id at 796 n.2. ("We... note that the restriction against all overnight
adult guests... applies equally to both parents. The trial court made no distinction
between homosexual and heterosexual relationships.").
216 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
217 See ia at 533-34.
218See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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adoption is in the best interests of the child. 19 Since constitutional
challenges to denial of adoption based on sexual orientation will fail in the
vast majority of cases, this section focuses on the policies underlying
decisions to grant or deny an adoption to a homosexual person. As an initial
matter, it is instructive to examine the attitudes and beliefs that shape the
laws and influence how courts exercise discretion when presiding over
adoptions."2 This section then reviews cases in which courts were called
upon to interpret statutes in order to illustrate how such perspectives
facilitate or obstruct a homosexual person's attempt to adopt a child.'
A. General Considerations of Legislatures and Courts in Determining
Whether a Homosexual is Eligible to Adopt
1. The Legality of Homosexual Conduct
While courts almost universally cite the interest of the child as the
overriding purpose of adoption statutes, several considerations influence
the best interests of the child when the person seeking to adopt is a
homosexual. Perhaps the most powerful argument against homosexual
adoption is found in states where the people, through their elected
representatives, have made homosexual sodomy illegal.t To permanently
place a child in the home of a person who openly practices illegal conduct
is to subordinate that child's interests to the interests of those seeking to
adopt. 4 This argument was articulated by In re Appeal Juvenile Action B-
10489,P where the appellate court affirmed the lower court's certification
of a bisexual man as unacceptable to adopt children. 26 The court noted that
the interests of the child must control the determination,2 and asserted
"[ilt would be anomalous for the state on the one hand to declare homosex-
ual conduct unlawful and on the other create a parent after that proscribed
219 See In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987) ("In foster
care and adoption cases the State by law has either the exclusive, or a highly
significant, responsibility to choose what is best for the child.").
'2o See supra notes 38-63 and accompanying text.
2' See infra notes 224-51 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 252-77 and accompanying text.
223 See, e.g., In re Appeal Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830, 835 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986).224 See id
m Id at 830.
26a at 835.
227 Id at 833-34.
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model, in effect approving that standard.. as the head of a state-created
family.' '28
This is a valid argument when there is no existing parent-child
relationship in question? When a de facto parent has already established
a parental bond with the child, however, the state's denial of adoption
undermines the interests of the child in question by depriving that child of
the inherent advantages of a legally recognized relationship.?0
The advantages of a legally recognized parent-child relationship
include the obligation of support, inheritance rights, health insurance and
other benefits through the parent's employment, and familial ties that
would protect the child's legal relationship with the de facto parent in case
of the death of the natural parent?' Where a child has become dependent
on an adult as a parental figure, either due to state action, 2 or because the
adult is in a long-term relationship with the child's legal parent 3 there is
no valid state interest in denying the legitimacy to a relationship that
already exists. Instead, the state deprives the child the benefits of a legal
relationship, and as a result, undermines his or her interests.
2. The Role Model Approach
An additional consideration motivating denial of adoption based upon
sexual orientation involves the state's interest in providing children with
strong role models. Parents serve as the primary role models in a child's
life?4 In recognition of this factor, one concern raised in adoptions is
Id at 835.
This is not to say that all criminals forfeit their parental rights, but sexuality
is amorally charged issue, and in the context of developing laws regarding family,
it is a relevant consideration.
"o See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315,320 (Mass. 1993) (noting
that allowing an adoption would entitle the child involved to significant financial
protection and benefits that are not otherwise available).
" Id; see also Elizabeth Zuckerman, Comment, Second Parent Adoption for
Lesbian-Parented Families: Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 729, 741-43 (1986) (explaining the necessity of second parent
adoption to provide children of lesbian partners with the advantages of a legal
parent).
212 See generally Lofton v. Butterworth, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1344-45 (S.D.
Fla. 2000). Curiously, Florida allows homosexual persons to foster children, but
deems them ineligible to adopt. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997). See
Lofton, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1344-45, 1344 n.1.
'
3 See infra notes 265-77 and accompanying text.
In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987).
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whether the prospective adoptive parent is an acceptable role model."
There seem to be two separate ideas underlying this concern. First, can a
homosexual parent serve the "modeling" needs of a child who will grow up
to be a heterosexual adult?236 Second, is the sexuality of a child influenced
by the sexuality of his or her parent?"3 7
The first aspect of this concern was explained by the court in State v.
Cox 8 In response to an equal protection challenge to a law that denied
homosexuals eligibility to adopt, the state posited that a high percentage of
adoptive children will be heterosexual? 9 As such: "[i]t is in the best
interests of a child if his or her parents can personally relate to the child's
problems and assist the child in the difficult transition to heterosexual
adulthood."24° The state's concern was underscored by its finding that many
children available for adoption have developmental problems that create a
special need for a "stable heterosexual household.""24 The court found that
the state's interest in providing heterosexual role models was sufficient to
support the constitutionality of the statute 42 On review, the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's reasoning.243
On its face, the reasoning of Cox has some merit, due to the broad
deference courts usually grant to the judgment of legislators under a
rational basis standard.2 " The state's argument in this case is, however,
" See State v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), quashed
on other grounds sub nom. Cox v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs.,
656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995) (approving the use of rational basis review, but
remanding for factual completion of the record to support the validity of the law
in questions); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d at 25.216 See Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1220 (articulating the state's interest in providing role
models who can provide education and guidance for adoptive children concerning
relationships and sex).
"
7 See In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d at 25-26.




242 Id at 1220 n.10 ("This reason may not be the only rational reason in support
of this statute, but it is a sufficient reason to support the constitutionality of the
statute in this case.").
23 Cox v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903
(Fla. 1995) (affirming the lower court's reasoning, but remanding for a completion
of the factual record to determine if the statute satisfied rational basis review under
equal protection analysis).244 See supra notes 38-63 and accompanying text.
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vulnerable to criticism in view of the fact that the state has not barred
homosexuals from serving as foster parents.' 5 To bar homosexuals from
adopting children, while allowing them to serve as foster parents under-
mines the argument that the state seeks to promote the interest of children
by providing appropriate role models. In either case, the adult is acting as
a parent, and thus serves as a role model for the child in their care.
The second aspect of the role model approach involves the concern that
the homosexuality of a parent may influence the sexual development of the
child. The validity of this concern turns upon the unsettled question
whether sexual orientation is a product of biology or environmental factors.
Courts are not satisfied that this question has been sufficiently resolved to
justify dismissing it as a rationale for excluding homosexuals from
adoption privileges. In In re Opinion ofthe Justices,2' the New Hampshire
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a proposed law that
would bar homosexuals from eligibility to adopt, provide foster care, or
certification of day care. 7 Under its equal protection analysis, the court
held that the state's interest in providing appropriate role models was
rationally related to the exclusion of homosexuals from foster parentage
and adoption based on concerns about the development of sexual
identity.248 "IT]he source of sexual orientation is still inadequately
understood and is thought to be a combination of genetic and environmen-
tal influences. Given the reasonable possibility of environmental influ-
ences, we believe that the legislature can rationally act on the theory that
a role model can influence the child's developing sexual identity." ' 9 Until
there is agreement about the source of homosexuality, states are within
their power to raise this factor as a concern thatjustifies denying homosex-
uals adoption privileges on the ground that the development of sexual
identity directly affects the interests of the child.
3. Social Stigma Attached to Homosexuality
A final justification for denying a homosexual person the privilege to
adopt arises from society's general disdain for homosexuality, and concern
"s See Matthewdl v. Weinberg, 645 So. 2d 487,489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
("The legislature... has not disabled homosexuals... from consideration as foster
parents.").
In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987).2471d at 22 (citations omitted).
2 41 1d at25.
2491 (citing Steve SusoeffAssessing Children's Best Interests When aParent
is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852,
883 n.194 (1985)).
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for how that disdain might affect the child of a homosexual. The Supreme
Court has rejected this as a reason for legal classification of persons, as
"[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect." ' Similarly, the rationale is
rejected as insufficient to support a law excluding homosexuals from
eligibility to adopt" 1 While mindful of the pain a child may experience
when ostracized by peers or subjected to cruel teasing, this perspective
reflects a wise refusal to validate prejudice by avoiding relationships that
some find objectionable.
B. Interpreting Adoption Statutes: Legally Formalizing Existing Parent-
Child Relationships
Statutes that define who may adopt do not generally consider the
situation in which an unmarried couple wishes to adopt, or when one
partner in a relationship legally joins in the parenthood of the biological
child of the other partner.52 For this reason, courts are called upon to
construe statutes to either permit or deny the adoption. While this issue
could affect any unmarried couple wishing to adopt, it is an especially
prominent issue for homosexual couples, who are uniformly denied the
right to marry z3 Courts construing statutes focus on the purpose of the
statute, the language, and the implications of a particular construction. In
this context, there is surprisingly little discussion of the sexual orientation
of the prospective adoptive parent.3P Case law reveals that results are often
favorable for the person seeking to adopt.Ps
0 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,433 (1984).
"' State v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1220 n.10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) ("We
are not overlooking the pressures and stresses that peer groups might place on an
adopted child because ofthe adoptive parent's homosexual activity. We are simply
not convincedthat such 'private biases' are a permissible rationale basis to support
this statute."), quashed on other grounds sub nom. Cox v. Fla. Dep't of Health &
Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995).
252 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 1 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
2s3 E.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307,310 (D.C. 1995) (holding
that it is impossible for two persons of the same sex to marry based on the nature
of marriage).
' But see In re Caitlin, 622 N.Y.2d 835, 840 (Fain. Ct. 1994) (requiring a
showing of negative impact to sustain any objection to adoptions by same sex
partners); In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.2d 997, 1001-02 (Sur. Ct. 1992)
(asserting sexual orientation or practices presumptively irrelevant in adoption
agency evaluations unless shown to adversely affect child's welfare).
' See, e.g.,Adoption ofB.L.V.B.,628 A.2d 1271,1276 (Vt. 1993) (construing
adoption statute to allow same-sex partner to adopt without terminating right of
biological parent).
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1. The Purpose of-Adoption Statutes
The overriding purpose of adoption is to serve the interests of the
adoptive child. 6 The court is generally faced with a situation in which the
person seeking to adopt has already served as the child's de facto parent for
a significant period of time.?7 Therefore, in addition to the tangible
advantages that inhere in adoption," the court must also consider that the
child involved has formed a parent-child bond with the adult. Courts
generally tend to recognize that the purpose of the adoption statute would
be undermined by denying the adoption in such cases. 259 Not all courts,
however, are so willing to broadly construe statutes to effectuate their
stated purpose. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin asserted that "the factthat
an adoption... is in the child's best interests, by itself, does not authorize
a court to grant the adoption."
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Connecticut refused to depart from a
strict literal construction of the state's adoption statute.26 The court held
that Connecticut law did not allow the lesbian partner of a biological
mother to adopt the natural mother's child.2" The court acknowledged that
a provision in a general statute directed liberal construction of adoption
statutes to promote the interests of the child in question, yet the court held
that "the best interests of a child cannot transcend statutorily defined
jurisdictional boundaries. 2" The court concluded that a biological
mother's lesbian partner could not adopt the child without terminating the
parental rights of the sole legal parent as provided in the language of the
adoption statute.2"
26 E.g., id. at 1273 ("[W]e are mindful that the state's primary concern is to
promote the welfare of children...
217 See, e.g., id at 1272.
"' See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
29 See Adoption ofB.L. VB., 628 A.2d at 1276 ("To deny legal protection of
[the parent-child] relationship ... is inconsistent with... the public policy of this
state, as expressed in our statutes affecting children.").
260 Georgina G. v. Terry M. (In re Angel M.), 516 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Wis.
1994).
1 See In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035, 1048 (Conn. 1999).
262See id. at 1050-60.
203 Id. at 1048.
' Id at 1060; see CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-725 (West Supp. 2000)
(defining when a child may be free for adoption).
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2. Termination of the Natural Parent's Rights
When Unmarried Life-Partner Seeks to Adopt
Adoption statutes provide for the termination of parental rights upon
the court granting an adoption.265 Therefore, courts must determine the
applicability of such provisions when the couple does not intend to
terminate the natural parent's rights, but desires to share equally in parental
responsibilities. In In reAdoption ofEvan,2" the life partner of a six-year-
old child's biological mother sought to legally adopt the child they had
raised together since his birth.267 The court had to determine whether the
adoption would have the effect of terminating the biological mother's legal
rights as indicated by the domestic relations law.268 Recognizing the
tangible and intangible benefits the child stood to gain from the adoption,2 69
the court concluded that the adoption would be in his best interests.270 The
court held that "where the adoptive and biological parents are in fact co-
parents ... New York law does not require a destructive choice between
the two parents."2 " Two years later, the Court of Appeals of New York
reached a similar conclusion, asserting that while the adoption statute must
be strictly construed, it must be strictly construed according to the
"legislative purpose as well as [the] legislative language."2 2 The court
noted that the statute was not entirely reconcilable,2" and concluded that
the law "does not invariably require termination in the situation where the
biological parent... has agreed to retain parental rights and to raise the
child together with the second parent."274
26 E.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1999) ("After the making of
an order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved of
all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall have no rights
over such adoptive child or to his property by descent or succession...266 In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. 1992).
267 Id at 998.
268 See id. at 1000.
269 Id at 998-99.
270 Id at 999.
271 Id at 1000.
2721 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397,399 (N.Y. 1995).
273 See id at 400.
2 4 Id at 404 (noting that the exceptions provided in the statute for stepparent
adoptions, adoptions by minor fathers, and open adoptions "share such an
agreement as the common denominator"); see also Adoption of Tammy, 619
N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) ("[W]hen a natural parent is a party to a joint
adoption petition, that parent's legal relationship to the child does not terminate on
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Some courts address the problem posed by termination provisions by
fitting the homosexual partner into the stepparent exception sometimes
provided in adoption statutes. The Supreme Court of Vermont took this
approach in Adoption ofB.L. VB.275 The court noted that the purpose of the
provision was "to clarify and protect the legal rights of the adopted person
at the time the adoption is complete, not to proscribe adoptions by certain





Since courts generally refuse to recognize constitutional challenges by
homosexuals denied adoption privileges, those seeking to adopt must rely
upon the enactment and interpretation of favorable adoption laws. For the
person seeking to adopt an unrelated child with whom there is no prior
relationship, the state's position as the exclusive authority for defining
eligibility to adopt is justified. Unlike the situation in which there is an
existing parent-child relationship, whether natural or de facto, the state's
denial of eligibility based on sexuality is not an interference with an
existing liberty or right.2' In such a case, it is the state that stands in the
parental role for those children who do not have parents. In the context of
an adoption proceeding in which there is an established parent-child bond,
however, the state interferes by refusing to grant legitimacy to the
relationship. When a court refuses to construe an adoption statute to allow
such an adoption, the child is denied significant tangible and intangible
benefits. 9 This contravenes the purpose of adoption statutes, and thus,
should render the law vulnerable to attack even under rational basis
constitutional review as applied to the child.
CONCLUSION
The existence of constitutional rights or lack thereof shapes the
analysis in custody, visitation, or adoption proceedings. Natural parents
entry of the adoption decree.").
2I See Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993).
276 Id at 1274.
2
'See In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R, 666 A.2d 535, 539 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) ("Our conclusion that the stepparent exception should
be broadly construed to enable this adoption to proceed is consistent with the views
of other states. . . .") (citing Adoption of B.L. VB., 628 A.2d at 1271); In re
M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 860 (D.C. 1995) (citing Adoption ofB.L. VB., 628 A.2d
at 1272).218 See In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987).
279See supra notes 55, 230-31 and accompanying text.
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possess fundamental liberty interests that must be protected by a vigilant
promotion of the countervailing state interest: the welfare of the child
involved. A presumption of detriment precludes the fact-based inquiry
necessary in highly individualized controversies in which the circumstances
and the needs of the particular child are likely to vary broadly. In the
adoption context, the state has broad discretion and need not consider
balancing the interest of the child against a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the constitution when defining who is eligible to adopt. The
courts are, however, faced with a more difficult question when the child
and adult have developed a familial bond. Here, the courts should interpret
statutes to effectuate the policy of serving the child's best interests.
